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To make trouble was, within the reigning discourse of my childhood, 
something one should never do precisely because that would get one in 
trouble. The rebellion and its reprimand seemed to be caught up in the 
same terms, a phenomenon that gave rise to my first critical insight into 
the subtle ruse of power: the prevailing law threatened one with trouble, 
even put one in trouble, all to keep one out of trouble. Hence, I concluded 
that trouble is inevitable and the task, how best to make it, what best way 
to be in it. 




Butler’s invitation to trouble could be answered in three acts. The first may be to recognise 
that law’s seductive promise of safety from violence is maintained through the imminent threat 
of the violence of reprimand and sanction. Rebellion, suggests Butler, is thus not foreign to 
our normative systems but is rather the impetus for a dialectics that pendulates between 
compliance and condemnation. The sanctioning of that movement (at once transgressive, at 
once normative) is thus work - perhaps the only work - that law performs. The force of law, in 
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other words, does not simply derive from its disciplinary content but from revolt itself.1 The 
second act may be to place ourselves at risk: at risk of losing our moral and ethical coordinates, 
and thus of ourselves, by interrupting this homeostasis between compliance and 
condemnation. This placement or displacement is at once an existential and corporeal action 
that takes place in common, community, communion. It is, in this sense, an inherently 
politico-ethical practice that demands a third preliminary act: a declaration of intention to 
trouble, and to be troubled. 
 
In this special edition of Sortuz we, together with fellow troublemakers, respond to Butler’s 
invitation. We do so not only by investigating law’s ruses of power through a series of critical 
reflections, but also by attending to the implications of such investigations for our own 
offices.2 In this introduction we accept, too, Butler’s invitation to make trouble through a 
writing that seeks to identify our individual realisations of law’s ‘subtle ruse of power’. 
Through this confessional writing we engage with method as a mechanics to trouble. This opens 
up the possibility of  responsiveness to, and of taking responsibility for, life in law. 
 
To synchronise our discordant anxieties and strategies, we triangulate our narratives of law and 
to law through a Chorus that acts as the critical consciousness that we share and with which we 
struggle. We then turn our attention to the meaning of these experiences in relation to the 
politics of working and living with law. Finally, we conclude with a few remarks about the 
engagement of methods in the rich collection of papers that form this special edition. In each 
author’s search for authority, rebellion and action, we are reminded of the importance of 
paying attention to the ways in which we choose to make trouble. 
 
                                                      
1 For an extended account of the ‘force of law’, see Derrida (1992).  
2 Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh (2007) describe Salmond’s account of the office of the jurist in their 
article “The Persona of the Jurist in Salmond’s Jurisprudence: on the Exposition of ‘What Law is …’”. In particular, 
they suggest that ‘Office can be considered in two aspects. First, the office of jurist is an office of State (civis). 
Second, the office is practiced through legal science…the genres of jurisprudence delimit an office as much as a 
method of organization and exposition of legal materials’ (Dorsett and McVeigh 2007, 774). 
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I.  EPISODE: QUESTIONING AUTHORITY 
  
Scene: An inner-city bridge over the excavated remnants of an unfinished building project.  
  
Enter Olivia: Everyday, I walk above this empty space of ruined concrete and metallic debris on 
my way to my office as government solicitor. Each time I walk this bridge, my gaze falls on the 
multiple images of the Wandjina, hidden amongst the matrix of graffiti. 
  
Chorus: Why do you repeat this gaze?  
   
Olivia: Sacred to many indigenous peoples in Australia, including those whose land I walk 
above, these Wandjinas mark the land as Aboriginal law. They remind me of Anglo-Australian 
common law’s highly ambiguous and destructive relationship with indigenous jurisdictions. 
They remind me that this bridge and this government building, which form part of the 
institution of the State, are marked by Aboriginal law. How can I speak of this unsettlement? I 
cannot ask the questions of law I want to ask. I represent the State. I embody this institution. 
As a newly pledged solicitor, charged with fidelities to both law and State, this reminder of the 
presence of Aboriginal law is unsettling. I feel trapped by law’s structures and my allegiance to 
them.   
   
Chorus: What will you do?  
   
Olivia: I want my voice back. In this moment of silence, walking the line above questions I 
want to, but cannot ask, it is time to walk away from my office as government solicitor and my 
formal obligations to law and State. I will search for a way to speak of, and to, law’s structures. 
By leaving this bridge, I make my choice to refute the silence.  
   
Exit Olivia.  
   
Scene: A Colombian law school, which has seemingly forgotten its radical origins.    
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Enter Luis: I received my training in law in a place founded, in the 19th century, on the 
principles of radical liberalism – a movement which valued law as the moderator of a society 
based on secular and humanistic values. This rebellious impulse against a post-colonial order, 
which resisted questions about its alliance to the Catholic Church and its systemic class, race 
and gender discrimination, was translated to me, a century later, in the form of my doctrinal 
training in the civil tradition. Trained in the body of law, through the routines of positive and 
procedural law, I always felt these radical origins were somehow lost in the century that had 
past since its foundation. I always felt the ideals of questioning the order had become paved by 
the acceptance of law as it is, instead of law as a form of radical living. Law’s form has become 
more important than its relationship with the wider context in which we are living.  
   
Chorus: What does this loss of relation mean?  
   
Luis: Law as a promise of radical life and the ideals of questioning law’s order has been 
replaced by an acceptance of the formality offered by law’s text. The Colombian conflict and 
its violence intensified to such an extent that each year at University is marked by my memory 
of the assassination of public figures. With others I clung to the formality of law without 
taking responsibility for our crisis in more creative ways.  
   
Chorus: What will you do with this memory?  
   
Luis: The formality of law is short-sighted. The official sources of law, as blind impositions, 
need to be interrogated. But more than this, I remember the rebellious impulse that created 
this institution and with the memory of this impulse, choose to begin engaging with fields and 
methodologies perceived as peripheral to law. This decision allows me to re-locate myself in 
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Years pass and Luis relocates to Australia.  
   
Luis: My uneasiness before the law persists in this new place. I have been inscribed and 
instructed in the Colombian legal jurisdiction and I have transposed myself to this foreign 
territory and lost my capacity to speak before the law.  
   
Olivia: I, too, lost my capacity to speak. How will you find yours?  
   
Luis: Law requires an eternal complicity of those who speak - where this speech can occur and 
what can be spoken. The perverse relationship law maintains with its sources of authority 
makes me uneasy. It is the incapacity of law, in its official guises, to respond to the full 
meaning of life that is lacking. My compromise is to understand and work in such a dynamic 
by alternating my role before the law as scholar, lawyer and citizen. Shifting between these 
positions, I both assume and reinvent what law is and should be. 
   
Exit Luis.  
   
Scene: A University in the Antipodes.  
   
Enter Yoriko: During the first few years of my legal education I searched for figures of 
authority, rebellion and action: for truth in the authority of law; for the institution of a new 
more ‘just’ power through rebellion, and for a body which would bear one or both, through 
action.  
   
Chorus: What did you find?  
   
Yoriko: Something unexpected. Truth and justice cut short each expedition with brief 
revelations of their paradoxical logic.  
   
Chorus: What did you do with these revelations?  
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Yoriko: Despite being trained to become a productive body of- and for the law, I found it 
difficult to accept this inheritance and returned to the academy. My disappointment in law’s 
failure to deliver (to be delivered) was followed by a desire to find out how, as a migrant 
feminist, I could institute a relation to law that did not rely upon a sacrificial economy. My 
desire to displace law elsewhere, however, is shadowed by two persistent questions: who, or 
what, would take its place? And, what if this re-emplacement is authorised by law itself? 
 
Chorus: You stand before- or as the law and still, there is no way in and no way out. To revolt 
or to surrender would be madness, would it not? 
 
Yoriko: A madness to which I might unconditionally surrender my lawyerly body. Perhaps it 
will be in this instant of unconditional madness, in a still-frame of catastrophe, that I will find 
the hand-trick of law’s easy constitution.   
   
Olivia, Luis and Yoriko: Having received law in the context of a predominantly doctrinal and 
positivist pedagogy, we have each failed to perform a reproduction and maintain a passive 
acceptance of this inheritance. We turn, as others have done, towards critical legal thinking.  
 
Lawyers responding to a call to critique find themselves intermittently abandoning their own 
office as if the authority to appear before the law and to speak to it must be suspended in 
order to critique. The relation of critical lawyers to the image and office of the sovereign 
becomes - as it has always been for sociologists, anthropologists, feminists and others - 
mediated. They - we - are filled with anxiety that we transgress too much, or not enough, and 
writing of, as, or against law insists on becoming a confession. This confessional writing is 
replete with the idioms of a transplanted Judeo-Christian tradition: a tradition, no less, which 
claims its subjects as its own. Methodology here irrupts as a form of enacting ourselves before 
the law. It is not simply a set of silent steps. The question of method enables us to critique law 
without abandoning it. This realisation of our writing as confession enables us to understand 
our work in relation to law’s economy. 
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II.  REBELLION AND A DEADLY EMBRACE  
 
Chorus: So why interrogate? Why revolt if there is no ‘outside’ of law to revolt from?  How 
does methodology mediate your – our – relations to law? 
   
In the opening article to this edition, Anne Orford asks what we want from authority, rebellion 
and action. Orford’s question, preempting a telos of revolt, gestures towards the complicated 
relation that we, as trained practitioners of the law, have to- and as authority.  
   
For us, concerns with law and law’s authority do not simply pose a challenge to be overcome 
in order to somehow arrive at a space where there is no longer anymore law to worry about. 
The authority of law is the place at which our interrogations about law’s power and its 
dynamics begin. Importantly, this is an interrogation executed on multiple fronts that cannot 
be collapsed into one voice. There may be no ‘outside’ of law and its authority, but we also 
recognise there is no single way of making trouble in law. If we are all within the boundaries of 
law, it is also certain we are not one before the law. Embracing disparate questionings of the 
images, practices and values of law, we revolt against (or toward) them not because we seek a 
utopic displacement of authority, but to expand our possible ways of living as- and with law. 
 
This set of relations is captured in Michel Foucault’s reading of a famous allegory, the ‘Ship of 
Fools’ (Foucault 2001: 5). While the Ship of Fools has traditionally been interpreted as an 
allegory of moral decrepitude,3 Foucault describes it as a “crew of imaginary heroes, ethical 
models, or social types embarked on a great symbolic voyage”, who seek, “if not fortune, then 
at least the figure of their destiny or their truth.” (Foucault 2001: 5). For us, as for Foucault, 
the Ship of Fools is a visual allegory of what we seek in our interrogation of the order of law. 
Our fools’ ethic is a joyous, multiplicitous and a cacophonous journey, gently making and 
unmaking the normative boundaries of our communities.                                                        
3 The Ship of Fools is most commonly associated with an interpretation crystallized by Sebastian Brant in the 
15th century (Brant 1971), and illustrated by Hieronymus Bosch (c. 1490-1500, see Image 1). Both Brant and 
Bosch imagine the allegory as the condensation of vices and weaknesses, and the vulgarity and decadence, of their 
time. 
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In our own ways, we are in search of laws beyond imperial pretension to explore the 
possibilities of other orderings of law. Exploring on behalf of our communities, we do not 
challenge authority with the aim of embracing it for our sole benefit, but rather, engage in an 
exercise that calls into question assumptions of peace, order and morality of the wider 
community. In this way our revolt, as with Foucault’s fools, function as a collective 
performance that invites others to reflect on themselves, and their relationships with their 
communities and their laws. As lawyer-researchers we journey, perhaps, as Foucault’s Ship of 






Image 1: The Ship of Fools, Hieronymus Bosch (c. 1490-1500). 
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This melancholic and unsynchronized search for other truths (and perhaps with it, some kind 
of salvation?) undergirds our interrogation of legal text and practice. Distinguished from 
traditional positivist readings of law that may assume a smooth relation between law and its 
subjects, we here characterize our relation to law, and our methodologies, as agonic. Resisting 
silence and its complicity, a process of reflexive questioning marks our work. Fools we are, to 
revolt from or as the insides of law, and fools attuned, perhaps, to dialectical movements 
between the shores of one norm and the next. Modes of travel or methods of reading become 
a relation, mediation, translation and strategy with which we negotiate the persistent ethical 
and political concerns that haunt those shores. 
 
III.  ACTION: METHODOLOGIES FOR MAKING TROUBLE 
  
Chorus: Finally, how do you act, and where? 
 
The work of reading law, as we explore here, requires time (to think; to read; to interrogate), 
space (to perform our interrogation; a place to fill with our bodies and to make trouble) and 
involves strategy (ways of reading; borrowings from other fields; survival within the academy). 
Through this combination of time, space and strategy emerge our methodologies. Our 
performance in front of- or for law becomes, as a result, a daily performance with the potential 
to transform into a different kind of practice. 
 
This special edition of Sortuz looks at the forms such rebellions may take, including the 
different strategies involved and the stakes of their performance. This edition brings together a 
selection of papers presented at the workshop, In Search of Authority, Rebellion, and Action: 
Postgraduate & Early Career Researchers’ Workshop on Methodological Approaches to Legal Scholarship, 
held at the Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne, on 18 – 19 December 2008. All 
the contributions to this edition display, we believe, alternative and strategic methodological 
engagements with law and its potential. As demonstrated in each article, our capacities to make 
trouble; to revolt, embrace or contest authority; to act in front of or for law, do not constitute 
a hegemonic or uniform act. Rather, as critical legal scholars we assume a multiplicity of 
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avenues of interrogation, alliances and tasks. It is in these assumptions, as discussed both in 
this Introduction and throughout this special edition, that the political nature of methodology 
is revealed.   
 
These ideas are further illustrated in the photograph that serves as the front cover of this 
edition (see Image 2).  
 
 
Image 2: G8 Summit 2005 protests, Edinburgh (4 July 2005). 
Copyright, Dave Hogan. 
 
Taken by freelance photographer Dave Hogan in the main street of Edinburgh, Princes Street, 
during the protests against the G8 Summit 2005 – which was held at the Gleneagles Hotel 
located less than 50 miles from Edinburgh – we can see a photographer being photographed.4 
Kneeling in front of a barricade of formal authority, the image asks us to consider how and 
where to act, emphasising the importance of perspective – of method – in critical engagements 
and most of all, reminding us that questioning authority – law – is always a matter of practice. 
Who are we in front of authority? Are we the photographer? Are we being photographed? 
Across which trajectories do the optics of power travel? Perhaps, as critical legal scholars, we 
                                                      
4 We thank Dave Hogan for the use of his photograph. 
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question authority by textualising its uneasy existence and potentially revealing the multiple 
manners, places and subjectivities through which we can make trouble.  
 
At the beginning of this edition, Anne Orford calls for a reconsideration of the relation 
between worldly authority, rebellion and action (or activism) and observes that what is at stake 
in the performances of critical legal scholars is the question of what we want. Orford offers an 
important reminder that law is one name given to the conventional and official transmission of 
authority and the movement of meaning through the written text. For Orford, legal scholars 
maintain a symbiotic relation to text because of a belief in “the sacred authority of writing, and 
to the sacred authority of law and all that it promises.” She leaves us thinking how we, as legal 
scholars, can gather to speak about law while still being able to see law not as an echo of its 
sources of authority but as a platform to imagine what law promises. This is, of course, a 
question about our methodological decisions as both legal scholars and law subjects. 
 
Orford’s call for a productive reconsideration between law, text and authority is taken up in 
Angus Frith’s meditative reflection on the nature of research in the hybrid spaces between 
indigenous and non-indigenous legal systems. As a non-indigenous ‘Gubbah’ lawyer and 
scholar, Frith challenges law’s methodological assumptions of authority and shares a critique of 
the negotiation of multiple roles and fidelities involved in working between and across 
different juridical epistemologies and legal texts. 
 
Heather Morgan is also concerned with the role of the researcher and its capacity for making 
trouble. In her artful critique of the markings of criminal actions, Morgan uses the body of the 
researcher, her body, as a tool of observation. Morgan contemplates a register of law-making 
often overlooked in legal scholarship, a register Morgan describes as the “action before the 
punishment, before the courtroom, even before the crime.” Navigating CCTV rooms, she 
examines the techniques and material practices involved in framing criminal actions and 
constructing the criminal body in an exploration of anxieties surrounding the gendered nature 
of law’s gaze.  
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Jason Taliadoros and Mickaël Ho Foui Sang both consider how best to make trouble through 
their explorations of the disciplinary boundaries of researching between law and history. In a 
nuanced contemplation of the nature of medieval understandings of ‘rights’ by lawyer-
theologians, Taliadoros reveals the constant methodological negotiations required in 
embracing trans-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary work. As a lawyer-historian, he explicates 
the role and status of the double body of the lawyer-theologian, ever conscious of the 
intricacies in navigating disciplinary discourses.  
 
Ho Foui Sang advances Taliadoros’ concern with the difficulties of researching between and 
across disciplines in his thought-provoking analysis of memorial laws in France. Ho Foui Sang 
unravels layers of this contemporary French debate as part of a broader analysis on the nature 
of legislation and contestation over the naming of historical truth. Reflecting on the roles 
attributed to both lawyers and historians in this debate, Ho Foui Sang observes both law’s and 
history’s anxious relations to truth and authority and calls for careful consideration of the 
nature of disciplinary barriers in rethinking these important questions of truth, memory and 
authority.  
   
Finally, Jothie Rajah concludes this special edition with a rich account of the importance of 
actively considering the question of methodology in legal scholarship. Reflecting on the 
political nature of methodology, Rajah questions the relationship between authority and 
methodology in her research. In an evocative exposition of the Singaporean state as both rule 
of law and rule by law, Rajah shares what is at stake in her performance as a legal scholar and 
implicitly suggests what may be at stake in all of our performances as legal scholars.  
  
To conclude, it is through explicit considerations of different methodological engagements 
with law that the contributors to this special edition hope to make trouble, and invite readers 
to enjoy the same. 
   
Barr, Eslava & Otomo 
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